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Obama’s Interventions: 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya
Luca Tardelli
In its first 3 years, the Obama administration fully embraced the intervention in Afghanistan it inherited, led a second intervention to its conclusion in Iraq, and initiated a third military 
intervention in Libya. In all three cases, decreasing American public support for foreign 
operations and stiff fiscal constraints have focused public attention on the timing and 
levels of US military involvement in these three countries. While important, the ongoing 
debate over the allocation of military troops and scarce financial resources obscures a 
more fundamental question concerning the strategic dimensions of US interventionism. 
Both judgements of success and the contours of interventionism under Obama will be 
shaped by the strategic choices taken in Afghanistan, the strategic options available in 
Iraq after the exit of US troops, and the strategic lessons of US intervention in Libya.
MAKING CHOICES: GETTING AFGHANISTAN RIGHT
As early as February 2009, Obama fully endorsed the conflict in Afghanistan, pitting the conflict against 
al-Qaida and the Taliban as the ‘right war’ of necessity in contrast to the ‘wrong war’ of choice waged in 
Iraq. By giving priority to the Afghan conflict, Afghanistan became Obama’s own war of choice. Between 
2009 and 2010, as resources and manpower were being reduced in Iraq, defence funding for Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan doubled: from $52 billion to $100 billion. Furthermore, the 
Obama administration authorised a surge of 33,000 troops in Afghanistan in December 2009, which 
coupled with further deployments, brought US troop levels in the country from 30,000 to 100,000.
At the same time, the administration confirmed the US and NATO’s commitment to a full handover of 
security responsibilities to Afghan authorities and forces in 2014. To this end, the administration announced 
a return to pre-surge levels by the end of summer 2012 – with the withdrawal of the first 10,000 US 
troops by the end of 2011. The decision to withdraw surge troops has been criticised in some quarters for 
jeopardising the results achieved so far and for being driven more by electoral and fiscal considerations 
rather than a realistic assessment of both the evolving Afghan security context and the ability of President 
Hamid Karzai’s government to take over security responsibilities in 2014. Yet troop deployments are 
only part of the administration’s strategy in Afghanistan. To assess their utility in Afghanistan and the 
eventual risks of a return to pre-surge military deployments, it is necessary to evaluate the overarching 
goal and objectives set by the administration in Afghanistan as well as the strategy employed to meet 
these objectives. According to President Obama, in order to meet the overarching goal of the defeat 
of al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US has sought to ‘deny al-Qaida a safe haven’; ‘reverse 
the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government’; and, ‘strengthen the 
capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take the lead responsibility’. 
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To secure its objectives and assure a smooth transition 
to Afghan lead, the administration has set forth a 
‘three track strategy of fight, talk, build’. 
In terms of the military campaign, the administration 
has followed two courses. The surge was intended 
from the beginning as a short-term deployment aimed 
at seizing the initiative from the Taliban and improving 
security conditions on the ground in order to ease the 
transition process to the Afghan National Army (ANA) 
and Afghan National Police (ANP). Contemporarily, 
the Obama administration has dramatically increased 
the number ‘kill-or-capture’ operations and drone 
strikes against Taliban and al-Qaida commanders 
and leaders – most famously against Osama bin 
Laden – in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2010 
alone, the US government has authorised 118 drone 
strikes compared to the 44 authorised by the Bush 
Administration between 2004 and 2008.
The combined effect of these two tools paints a 
rather unsatisfactory picture. On the one hand, the 
number of attacks initiated by the Taliban dropped by 
26% between July and September 2011 compared 
to the same periods in 2010. However, the very 
success of the surge pushed the Taliban and other 
anti-government forces, particularly the Haqqani 
Network, to increasingly rely on improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), targeted assassinations, and high-profile 
attacks in preference to conventional operations, as 
demonstrated by the attacks against the US embassy 
and NATO headquarters in Kabul in September 
2011 and the killing of Barhuddin Rabbani, head 
of the Afghan High Peace Council. Importantly, the 
intensification of military operations in the South and 
the increased use of IEDs have led to a 15% increase 
in Afghan civilian casualties in 2010, a trend that has 
been confirmed also in the first months of 2011. At 
the same time, the Taliban have also demonstrated 
their ability to expand their presence and influence 
over non-Pashtun areas, particularly in the North. So 
whilst the surge seems to have succeeded in 2011 
in seizing the initiative from the Taliban, it has so far 
failed to counter the Taliban’s ability to control new 
areas or significantly lower the level of insecurity in 
the country. 
Furthermore, the military strategy adopted may also 
prove counterproductive. First, targeted operations 
against the Taliban underscore the potential 
inconsistency between the counterterrorism and 
stabilisation campaigns pursued by the US. In particular, 
continued drone attacks on Pakistani soil are fuelling 
resentment in Pakistani public opinion, running the 
risk of delegitimising Pakistani state institutions and 
fostering the very instability that favours al-Qaida 
and the Taliban. Second, these operations pose direct 
problems to the second pillar of US strategy; that 
is, the search for a political solution to the conflict 
in Afghanistan through US direct negotiations with 
representatives of the Taliban and the Haqqani 
Network. The fundamental challenge with this regard 
is the lack of consistency between the negotiations 
track and military operations. Operations against 
mid- and high-ranking insurgency commanders not 
only endanger the long-term support of Pakistani 
authorities in the negotiations process but also run 
the risk of eliminating important interlocutors among 
the Taliban leadership, thus making space for younger 
and more radical commanders.
More importantly, the security situation in Afghanistan 
highlights significant shortcomings in the US’s efforts 
to expand the institutional capacity of the Afghan 
government and help the latter increase economic 
opportunities for Afghanistan. Despite the progress 
made at the institutional and economic level, efforts 
in this regard have still failed to bear fruits. Afghan 
citizens are increasingly concerned by the ruling 
elite’s corruption and the government’s inability to 
guarantee security, or provide jobs and basic services 
at the local level. Increasing civilian casualties are a 
stark reminder of the Afghan government’s failings 
in the security arena, despite an increasing number 
of personnel. The role played by patronage networks 
and overly-centralised institutional arrangements in a 
context characterised by stark regional differences and 
traditional forms of local authority further undermine 
the legitimacy of the Kabul government, favouring 
the establishment of shadow Taliban institutions and 
courts providing security, justice, services, and voice 
to local authorities.
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Thus US strategy in Afghanistan is more challenging 
than usually recognised by commentators focusing 
exclusively on the question of troop levels. So far, the 
surge has had limited effects; more importantly, it has 
not assured substantial gains in terms of fewer civilian 
casualties and improved governance. To succeed in 
its current form, the Obama administration’s strategy 
requires a shift in priorities towards strengthening 
Afghan capacities and a significant coordination effort 
to ensure consistency between the different military 
and non-military tools employed. 
SEEKING OPTIONS: IRAQ 
Fulfilling a key electoral promise, last October Obama 
confirmed the withdrawal of the remaining 39,000 
US troops from the ‘wrong war’ in Iraq. America’s 
exit takes place amidst increasing scepticism among 
American citizens concerning US involvement and 
security conditions in Iraq that have significantly 
improved since the 2008. Overall, the Iraqi Army 
amounts at 271,000 strong, and, in contrast to the 
Afghan security forces, has demonstrated its ability to 
control Iraqi territory and conduct operations against 
anti-government groups and militias, as exemplified 
by its 2008 operations against Shia militias in Basra. 
At the political level, the 2010 parliamentary elections 
demonstrated the vitality of the Iraqi democratic 
experiment, with a considerable turnout (62%) and 
increased Sunni participation. This contributed to the 
narrow victory of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement 
(INM) over Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of 
Law Coalition (SLC) and the establishment of a broad 
coalition government under the latter. Significantly, 
the INM surprising success gave both voice to Sunni 
communities and, at least in the short term, impeded 
a further concentration of power in the hands of 
al-Maliki, who had already established an alarming 
degree of control over the country’s civilian and military 
institutions. 
Despite this positive outlook, the inability of the Obama 
administration to secure an agreement with Baghdad 
to maintain even a minimal presence of US troops in 
Iraq has been widely criticised. Obama’s pledge to 
withdraw from Iraq coupled with the timetable set 
by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed in 
November 2008 significantly limited the room for 
an agreement. SOFA set out a clear roadmap for US 
troop withdrawals, with all remaining US troops due 
to leave by the end of 2011. Moreover, the possibility 
of an agreement, even on a residual US force in Iraq, 
was ultimately made impossible by Iraqi coalition 
government and particularly the Sadr Movement’s 
opposition to both continued US military presence 
in the country and the granting of immunity to any 
remaining American troops.
The withdrawal of US troops may have three 
consequences for Iraq’s internal stability. First, Iraqi 
security forces’ operational capabilities may be 
hampered and their on-going training programmes 
significantly slowed down. Second, US troops currently 
play a role in containing the possibility of renewed 
tensions among different ethnic and political groups, 
for instance, performing an important peacekeeping 
function along the disputed internal border between 
the Kurdish regions and the rest of Iraq through joint 
patrols with Iraqi forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga. 
Similarly, US influence was significant in ending the 
political impasse created by the 2010 elections, and 
the fading American influence over Iraqi political actors 
raises the risk of renewed elite infighting for political 
power, in a political landscape still characterised 
by al-Maliki’s control over the Iraqi military and 
progressively altered by increasing numbers of political 
assassinations.
Notwithstanding these risks, the US is likely to continue 
to exert considerable influence over these issues 
even after the exit of US troops. First and foremost, 
American influence in Baghdad will be guaranteed by 
the presence of the largest US Embassy in the world. 
With an overall staff of nearly 17,000, the Embassy, 
together with the State Department (DoS), will play a 
central role in channelling political influence, economic 
aid, and overseeing on-going training operations, 
particularly the Iraqi Police Development Program 
(DPD). Furthermore, the DoS could play a central role in 
the Kurdish-Arab dispute by mediating an agreement 
between the two parties and, potentially, by favouring 
an international presence along the internal Arab-
Kurdish border within a UN framework. More generally, 
the DoS will be a key player in determining the 
practicalities of the Strategic Framework Agreement 
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signed in November 2008, which provides an overall 
legal framework for continued US-Iraqi cooperation, 
not only in the security sector, but also at economic 
and cultural level. Thus US troop withdrawal will hardly 
entail American disengagement from Iraq; rather 
there will be a shift from a military and Pentagon-led 
mission to a civilian-led mission. The key challenge 
for the Obama administration will be to provide the 
DoS with the necessary resources to ensure a smooth 
transition after December 2011.
Yet the possibility remains of increasing alienation 
of Iraqi citizens from a ruling elite that, during the 
negotiations following the 2010 elections, has 
demonstrated its interest in preserving its power 
position whilst high levels of corruption and lack of 
infrastructure continued to blight the lives of Iraqi 
citizens. Newly adopted anti-corruption legislation 
highlights Iraqi leaders’ awareness of the need to tackle 
its decreasing legitimacy. However, the government’s 
attempts at improving services have been little more 
than cosmetic. In July 2011, electricity supply remained 
at just 52% of estimated national demand. In this 
regard, the Obama administration’s ability to channel 
US aid to support Iraqi leaders that tackle these 
problems will be consequential. 
A second source of concern is represented by the 
possibility of increased Iranian influence over Iraq. 
These concerns tend to overestimate the utility 
of US troops in countering Iranian influence and 
simultaneously underestimate the possibilities offered 
by American military and diplomatic initiatives in the 
region. First, it is not entirely clear how even a minor 
US military presence would limit Iranian influence, 
which is channelled through political connections 
existing between Teheran and Shia political leaders 
in Iraq. Furthermore, even after the exit of American 
troops from Iraq, the US could still rely on its extensive 
military assets in the Persian Gulf to contain Teheran. 
As recent reports suggest, the US may also augment 
its military presence in the Gulf by increasing military 
coordination with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
and by redeploying some of its combat units from Iraq 
to Kuwait, to be used either in case of conflict with 
Iran or worsening security conditions in Iraq. Finally, 
the US is in a unique position to promote constructive 
relations between Baghdad and the GCC as a means 
of curbing Iranian influence over Iraq. Present border 
tensions between Iraq and Kuwait as well as Saudi 
suspicions towards Iraqi leaders significantly limit 
Baghdad’s access to alternative sources of diplomatic, 
security and economic support, and increase Baghdad’s 
reliance on Teheran.
Obama can hardly be accused of having lost Iraq. If Iraq 
is eventually lost to internal unrest or Iranian influence, 
this would have more to do with the administration’s 
inability both to guarantee a smooth transition to 
a civilian-led mission in the country and to operate 
the necessary military adjustments and diplomatic 
interventions that an evolving internal and regional 
setting may require. 
LEARNING LESSONS: LIBYA
 As Iraq shows, profound strategic interests will make 
it difficult for the Obama administration to disengage 
and diminish US presence in the Middle East. At 
the same time, the momentous change brought 
by the Arab Spring has only increased US strategic 
concerns in the region. Importantly, the Arab Spring 
seemed to have called the bluff of a foreign policy 
that had been predicated until 2011 on a pragmatic 
approach favouring an accommodation with the 
existing autocratic regimes in the Middle East. In 
doing so, the revolutions in North Africa precipitated a 
shift away from a Realist approach to the Arab world 
towards a peculiar form of interventionism and support 
for democratic transitions.
In his May 2011 speech on the Middle East and 
North Africa, Obama identified the Arab Spring as 
a ‘historic opportunity’ that US could seize, not to 
unilaterally spread democracy, but to support local 
efforts towards democratic change. In a confirmation 
of the liberal assumptions of US foreign policy, Hillary 
Clinton recently reaffirmed the American conviction 
that ‘real democratic change...is in the national interest 
of the US’. At the same time, she clarified that the 
US would not intervene when this would entail doing 
so unilaterally or when military intervention would 
endanger core interests such as the fight against al-
Qaida, the defence of allies, and the secure supply 
of energy. The result of this position, as manifest in 
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the Libyan intervention, is a versatile yet potentially 
contradictory policy approach that mixes realism 
and idealism, support for revolutionary change, and 
preservation of the status quo.
Obama’s decision to intervene in Libya resulted from 
the administration’s desire to both avert a possible 
humanitarian disaster in Benghazi as well as to 
safeguard the revolutionary transitions taking place 
both in Libya and neighbouring countries. On the one 
hand, the success of Operation Odyssey Dawn begun 
on 19 March (later Unified Protector under NATO 
command from 31 March) and the demise of Colonel 
Muammar Qaddafi’s regime presents the US and its 
allies with the usual challenges of similar post-conflict 
contexts: the possibility of conflict among victorious 
local forces, and the need for international support 
to prop up the newly established regime. At the same 
time, the Libyan case highlights new dynamics that 
will likely shape US interventionism in the remaining 
months of Obama’s first term and possibly beyond. 
In particular, three elements of the Libyan intervention 
are worth noting. First, in a clear example of the Obama 
administration’s multilateralist turn, the US intervened 
only when a legal authorisation was guaranteed, 
in the form of the UN Security Council Resolution 
1973, and in the presence of clear legitimisation and 
support from both the Libyan National Transitional 
Council and regional powers, primarily the League 
of the Arab States and NATO countries. 
Second, the shift operated in the early stage of the 
conflict from US command to NATO command and 
the more limited role taken by Washington in combat 
operations, whilst symbolically important to the sense 
of a new American approach to intervention, should 
not be overstated. First, US assets were key, in the 
first days of the operation, in suppressing Libyan air 
defence system, with the US conducting up to 50% 
of all coalition strike sorties before the handover to 
NATO on 31 March. Following this initial phase, the 
US acted as a key enabler of allied operations, by 
both continuing air operations via drones and by 
providing fundamental air-to-air refuelling capabilities; 
intelligence, surveillance, and targeting assets; and 
precision-guided ammunitions to its allies. Finally, the 
US DoS played an important role in both supporting 
the adoption of the UN Security CounciC resolution 
and in ensuring the cohesion of the coalition, by 
helping mediate the differences between the European 
allies. In this sense, Washington might not have played 
the role of the protagonist in the Libyan drama, but it 
fully directed diplomatic and military efforts to their 
eventual success. 
Third, the Libyan case highlights the possibility of 
intervention amidst public war-weariness and financial 
constraints. On the one hand, financial constraints did 
influence US operational decisions and the scale of US 
involvement but ultimately did not prevent a prolonged 
military intervention. Simply put, operational costs in 
Libya, in relative terms, were not exorbitant. Up to 
31 July 2011, operations in Libya amounted to $896 
million, which would have equalled to $2.7 billion if 
the operation had continued for an entire year – a 
much more limited financial request compared to the 
$107 billion allocated to Afghanistan for 2012. On the 
other hand, although the operation did not attract 
extensive public support, it did not attract heated 
contestations either. On the contrary, available polls 
indicate that a narrow majority of Americans (47%) 
approved of military action against Libya against a 
37% disapproval rate (Gallup, 22 March 2011). 
AFTER INTERVENTION: THE OBAMA DOCTRINE 
AND ITS LIMITS
The lessons of Libya and the transition processes in 
Afghanistan and Iraq paint a clear picture of the Obama 
administration’s interventionism – and its underlying 
doctrine. First, under the current administration the 
US will likely eschew the possibility of unilateral 
operations of regime change, yet it remains willing 
to embark on more limited and multilateral forms of 
military intervention. The more recent US decision 
to deploy 100 troops in support of the Ugandan 
and regional effort against the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) provides further evidence of the point. 
Second, the administration has also demonstrated its 
willingness to deploy more indirect and covert means 
of intervention, as exemplified by the increased use 
of special operations and drones to conduct targeted 
killings in Pakistan and Yemen, with Osama bin Laden 
and Anwar al-Awlaki being the most high profile cases. 
23
In the contours sketched here, the Obama doctrine 
represents a balancing act: between commitments 
and costs in age of austerity; between Liberal 
interventionism and Realist prudence in revolutionary 
times. However, limited and indirect options might not 
be available or effective in all contingencies and can 
easily lead to escalatory processes locking the US into 
prolonged conflicts. Overreliance on covert operations 
and limited forms of air operations, in particular, 
may also fuel the illusion of surgical interventionism, 
masking the profound political consequences that 
even limited and covert actions may entail in contexts 
shaped by complex domestic conflicts. 
In all three cases examined here, US strategic choices, 
more than the levels of US troops in these countries, 
are having or will have dramatic impact on the target 
states. But ultimately, US success in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Libya will hinge on the cohesiveness, legitimacy, 
and quality of the political leadership of these 
countries. In this sense, the major limitation of the 
Obama doctrine is not related to the limited resources 
employed or to hastened troop withdrawals; rather 
it derives from its failure in offering a clear strategy 
on how to use US power to affect the success of 
those ruling elites in providing security, economic 
opportunities, and political representation to their 
citizens following US military intervention.■
